When Do Employees Become Entrepreneurs? by Hellmann, Thomas
 
 
Appendix  
 
to accompany article in  
Management Science  
 
 
 
 
“When do employees become entrepreneurs?” 
 
 
 
 
Thomas Hellmann 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 
 
 
Date 0                        Date 1 Date 2               Date 3 
 
             
                   ├──────────────────┼─────────────────┼────────────────┤ 
 
 
Firm and employee sign 
employment contract 
 
Firm determines optimal 
bonus policy (wa, wx, wy,) 
 
Firm commits to a 
development policy δ 
 
 
With probability λ employee 
has an idea 
 
With probability γ core state is 
good 
 
Employee  privately chooses 
either A (core task)  
or B (idea exploration) 
If B was chosen, idea feasible 
with probability p 
 
If employee has IP rights, 
firm can offer internal 
development (δy); otherwise 
employee leaves to do a start-
up (δx) 
 
If firm has IP rights, it can 
choose between shelving (δ0), 
internal development (δy), or 
a spin-off (δx)  
 
If employee chose A, then expected 
return is a if core state was strong, and 
φa if core state was weak 
 
If employee chose B, and the innovation 
was developed internally (δy), then the 
expected return is y; if innovation was 
developed externally (start-up or spin-
off), then the expected return is x 
 
 
    
 
 
Table A2: Key notation
A Employees choice to focus on core task
a Returns to core task
B Employees choice to explore new idea
x, y Fraction of utility that constitutes a private benet
x Policy of developing innovations externally
y Policy of developing innovations internally
0 Policy of not developing innovations (shelving)
EIP Regime where intellectual property rights belong to employee
FIP Regime where intellectual property rights belong to rm
 Probability that returns a occur when core prospects are weak
 Probability that core prospects are strong at date 1b1, b2 Critical values of , satisfying 1 > b1 > b2 ? 0
 Probability that employee obtains an idea at date 1b Critical value of 
p Probability that an idea turns into feasible innovation
  Equilibrium where employee never explores
 Equilibrium where employee explores only if core prospects are weak
+ Equilibrium where employee explores excessively (even if core prospects are strong)
wA, wy, wx Compensation for generating outcomes a, y or x
x Utility to an external venture (start-up or spin-o¤)bx1, bx2, bx3 Critical Critical values of x, satisfying 0 < bx1 < bx2 < y < bx3
y Utility to an internal venture
z Utility of employee in an internal venture (given by Max[yy; x])
Remember that a bar over a probability means its complement, e.g.,  = 1  
Proof of Proposition 2
It is useful to restate the rms utilities from equations (2) through (7) in
the main text.
U( ; y) = ( + )(a  pz 1)
U(; y) = (py   pz) + ( + )(a  pz)
U(+; y) = (py   pz) + ( + )a
U( ; x) = ( + )(a  px 1)
U(; x) = ( + )(a  px)
U(+; x) = ( + )a
We immediately note that U(+; y) > U(+; x), i.e., (+; x) is domi-
nated. Using  < b, we only need to compare three policies: ( ; x), (; x)
and (+; y). Consider rst the case of yy  x  y, then pz = px. To see
that ( ; x) is dominated by (+; y), note that U( ; y) = U( ; x) and
that the proof of Proposition 1 already establishes that U(+; y) > U( ; y).
Moreover, (; x) is also dominated by (+; y), since for pz = px we have
U(; y) > U(; x), and the proof of Proposition 1 establishes that U(+; y) >
U(; y). It follows that (+; y) is optimal for yy  x  y. For the remainder
of the proof we focus on x < yy.
Consider the e¤ect of x on the rms utility from the three candidate policies.
We note that
dU( ; x)
dx
=  ( + ) p

<
dU(; x)
dx
=  p( + ) <
dU(+; y)
dx
= 0 (using x < yy). This implies that there exists a critical valuebx , such that U(; x) > U( ; x) , x > bx . Similarly, there exists bx+  such
that U(+; y) > U( ; x) , x > bx+  and bx+ such that U(+; y) > U(; x)
, x > bx+ . Straightforward calculations reveal that the critical values are given
by bx1  bx  = p a 1 +  , bx+  = p ( + )a  (py   pz) 1    and bx2  bx+ =

p
a  (py   pz)
 + 
. It is easy to verify that
dbx1
da
> 0,
dbx1
dp
< 0,
dbx1
d
> 0,
dbx2
da
> 0,
dbx2
dp
< 0,
dbx2
d
= 0.
Consider 1  U(; x)   U(+; y) evaluated at bx . If 1 > 0, then
U( ; x) = U(; x) > U(+; y) at bx . Since dU( ; x)dx < dU(+; y)dx
this implies bx+  > bx . Since dU(; x)dx < dU(+; y)dx it also implies bx+ >bx . Moreover, dU( ; x)dx < dU(; x)dx implies bx+  < bx+ . Clearly bx  > 0.
Moreover, we have already shown that U(+; y) > U(; x) at x = yy, so
that bx+ < yy. Thus 1 > 0 implies 0 < bx  < bx+  < bx+ < yy < y.
We now examine the condition1 > 0. We have1 = a py+pz (+
)pbx . Using bx  = p a 1 +  , we obtain after transformations 1 > 0,
T () > 0 where T () = 2 1a+a a a ( 1 )(py pz).
For  ! 0 we have T () =  a   (py   pz) < 0, and for  ! 1 we have
T () =


(a  py + pz) > 0. We dene b1 so that T (b1) = 0. To show that b1
is unique, it su¢ ces to show that
dT ()
d
> 0 at T (b1) = 0. It is tedious but
straightforward to verify this condition.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us rst focus on the analysis where the rm can commit. In the main
text, we already showed that for ( ; 0), the rm sets wa = 0, so that
U( ; 0) = ( + )a.
We also need to re-derive the utility that the rm gets from all other policies.
For external developments x, the main di¤erence is that the employees outside
option is no longer px, but pxx+wx. Since the rm never wants to encourage
idea exploration, it is easy to see that wx = 0. Thus, for ( ; x), the rm sets
wa = pxx
 1, so that
U( ; x) = ( + )(a  pxx 1).
For (; x), the rm sets wa = pxx, so that
U(; x) = ( + )(a  pxx).
For (+; x), the rm sets wa = 0, so that
U(+; x) = ( + )a.
We immediately recognize that ( ; 0) dominates any of the policies with x.
What remains to be seen is how ( ; 0) compares to any strategy with y. From
Proposition 1, we only need to consider (+; y), where the rm sets wa = 0 so
that
U(+; y) = (py   pyy) + ( + )a.
Consider 2 = U( ; 0)   U(+; y). After transformations, we have 2 =
a + a   (py   pyy). From
d2
d
=  > 0, we note that 2 is an
increasing function of . For  ! 1 we have 2 = (a   py + pyy) > 0. We
nd b2 from 2 = 0 , b2 = py   a  pyy
a
. Note that b2 may actually be
negative for pyy > py   a, in which case the condition  > b2 is trivially
satised. To see that b2 < b1, we note that 1 can be written as 1() =
a (py pz) (+)pbx . Using z = pyy and 2() = (a py+pyy)
we obtain 1() = 2() a  (+)pbx . At b2 we thus have 1(b2) =
 a  ( + )pbx  < 0, and thus b2 < b1.
For completeness, we briey mention two additional policies with shelving,
namely (; 0) and (+; 0). These are rather strange policies, since the rm
needs to reward the employee for generating innovations that it then shelves. It
is easy to see that this is never optimal.
For the case where the rm cannot commit to a development policy, the
only policies available for x < y involve y. Hence the analysis is the same as
in Proposition 1, except that z is replaced by yy (since the employee does not
have x as an outside option).
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider now the case of x > y. We begin with the case where the employee
owns the IP. We immediately note that choosing y is a dominated strategy.
This is because in order to convince the employee to do an internal venture, the
rm has to o¤er wy = x yy, and receives a utility of y yy wy = y x < 0.
The rm is always better o¤ with x, which gives the employee the same utility,
but avoids the loss of y   x to the rm. Consider now the x strategy. Using
the same reasoning as in Proposition 2, we have
U( ; x) = ( + )(a  px 1)
U(; x) = ( + )(a  px)
U(+; x) = ( + )a.
We note that U(; x) > U( ; x) , px 1 + px + (px   a) > 0.
Moreover, U(+; x) > U(; x) ,  < ( + )px
a+ px
 bb. It is easy to verify
that bb > b. Thus (+; x) is the optimal strategy. Moreover, since x actually
requires no commitment, the optimal strategy is the same irrespective of whether
the rm is able to commit or not.
Consider now the case where the rm owns the IP. In this case we cannot
immediately eliminate the y strategy, since it is possible that the rm prefers
y over x, namely when y   yy > x   xx. To implement  , the rm can
use x, y or 0 and obtain
U( ; x) = ( + )(a  pxx 1)
U( ; y) = ( + )(a  pyy 1)
U( ; 0) = ( + )a
Clearly, ( ; 0) is the dominant of those three policies. For the same reason as
before, (; 0) also dominates (+; 0) and ( ; 0). We are thus left with four
additional policies. We have
U(; x) = (px  pxx) + ( + )(a  pxx)
U(; y) = (py   pyy) + ( + )(a  pyy)
U(+; x) = (px  pxx) + ( + )a
U(+; y) = (py   pyy) + ( + )a
We rst note that U(+; y) > U(; y),  < ( + )pyy
(a  py) + ( + )pyy
= b
and U(+; x) > U(; x) ,  < ( + )pxx
(a  px) + ( + )pxx
. Since
( + )pxx
(a  px) + ( + )pxx
 b, it follows that U(+; x) > U(; x) for  < b.
Thus, both (; y) and (; x) are dominated by (+; x). Next, consider the
relationship between (+; x) and (+; y). We have U(+; x) > U(+; y)
, x > 1  y
1  x
y  bxy. Consider rst the case where x < bxy. To nd the
optimal strategy, we only need to compare ( ; 0) with (+; y). We note that
U( ; 0) > U(+; y) ,  > py   a  pyy
a
= b2, so that ( ; 0) is the
optimal strategy for all x < bxy. For x > bxy, we compare ( ; 0) with (+; x).
We have U( ; 0) > U(+; x) , x <  + 
1  x
a
p
 bx3, so that ( ; 0) is
optimal for x < bx3 and (+; x) is optimal for x < bx3. We immediately note
that
dbx3
da
> 0,
dbx3
dp
< 0 and
dbx3
d
> 0.
We briey have a closer look at the critical value bx3. We note that at  = b2
we have bx3 = bxy, and for all  > b2 we have bx3 > bxy. Moreover, note that
x  y , bxy  y, so that x  y is su¢ cient to ensure that bx3 > y. One
minor di¤erence of the model with x < y is that for  close to b2, it is possible
that bx3(b2) < y.
The fact that (+; x) eventually becomes optimal for su¢ ciently large x
is not surprising, since for very large x, idea exploration becomes extremely
protable. The more interesting result is that (+; x) can be optimal for values
of x where idea exploration is still ine¢ cient with a strong core. Formally, this
is the case as long as x <
a
p
. We note that bx3 < a
p
,  < 1 x
 1
, so that for
any  2 (b2; 1 x 1) there exists a range of values of x (namely x 2 (bx3; ap )),
such that (+; x) is optimal, even though idea exploration is ine¢ cient with a
strong core.
As a last step, we need to consider the case where the rm has the IP, but
is unable to commit. In this case, any policy with 0 is not a credible policy. It
immediately follows that (+; y) is optimal for x < bxy and (+; x) is optimal
for x < bxy. Note that for x > y we have bxy > y, and for x < y we havebxy > y
Discussion of model restrictions
The main text uses paramter restrictions on ,  and the s. We now
discuss what happens to the model if we relax these restrictions.
Consider relaxing the assumption x = y. If the employee owns the IP, x
never matters for the analysis, since the employee always gets x anyway. If the
rm owns the IP, and is able to commit, then the proof of Proposition 4 shows
that the critical value bx3 remains the same for x 6= y. Thus, the only change
pertains to the case where the rm owns the IP and is unable to commit. In
fact, the only di¤erence concerns the critical value at which the rm switches
from the intrapreneurial equilibrium (+; y) to the entrepreneurial equilibrium
(+; y). The above proof of Proposition 4 shows that this critical value is
given by x =
1  y
1  x
y. Note that this simplies to x = y for x = y. To
get an intuition, consider x > y, so that the employee enjoys a higher private
benet in external ventures. In this case, the rm develops a slight preference for
internal ventures, precisely because the employee is less able to extract private
benets internally. For x 2 (y; 1  y
1  x
y) the rm now prefers internal ventures,
even though spin-o¤s are more e¢ cient. The employee cannot persuade the rm
to do otherwise, since she is wealth constrained.
Consider next relaxing the assumptions  > b1 (for Proposition 2) and
 > b2 (for Proposition 3 and 4). For lower values of , the rm is less concerned
about focusing employees, since the main benet of focus occurs when the core
prospects are strong. The proofs of Proposition 2 and 3 show that for lower
values of , the intrapreneurial equilibrium (+; Dy) becomes more prevalent.
For b2 <  < b1, it replaces the stubborn equilibrium in the EIP model.
For  < b2, it replaces the focused equilibrium, both in the EIP and FIP
model. This reinforces our previous point that as long as the rm assigns the
employee a task that is suitable most of the times (high ), it wants to ensure
that the employee remains focused on that task. Yet, if the core task o¤ers poor
prospects most of the times (low ), the rm becomes more open towards idea
exploration.
The analysis also uses the assumption  < b, which says that employees dont
get unrelated ideas too often. The condition implies that giving incentives for
the core task is expensive for the rm, since the rm has to give bonuses to many
employees that do not have any ideas. For larger  paying a bonus becomes
more worthwhile. For  > b, the rm prefers the e¢ cientequilibrium (,y).
This allows internal ventures, yet prevents excessive exploration through a core
bonus (wa = pz). This reinforces the notion that a rms policy of refusing
to implement internal ventures makes sense only if there are not too many
employees that want to generate innovations in the rst place.
Finally, it should be mentioned our analysis does rest on two important
assumptions. First, we rely on private benets. For y ! 0 we obtain b ! 0
and the e¢ cient equilibrium obtains. The intuition is that without private
benets it is relatively easy for the rm to dissuade the employee from exploring
ideas.1 Second, we rely on the employees wealth constraint. Our model builds
on Sappington (1983), who introduces a principal-agent model with risk-neutral
wealth-constrained agents. Without the wealth constraint, the rm has no real
cost to providing incentives for the core task, and the e¢ cient equilibrium
always obtains. Using wealth constraints has become a popular way of modeling
agency costs, because it allows for an intuitive yet tractable model.
1We believe that private benets are a natural way of modeling the employees prefer-
ences. Remember that they include not only non-monetary benets, but also nontransferable
nancial returns that the employee can always extract, such as through e¢ ciency wages, in-
formation rents or hold-up power. In an earlier version of the paper we explicitly modeled
private benets from hold-up, but then realized that the current specication is both simpler
and more general.
